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Abstract 
This article considers how the European Union and Member States’ responses to the COVID-19 crisis 
in the first half of 2020 could inform climate action in Europe, and particularly the resumption of 
actions on the EGD. It first outlines the EU’s public health and economic responses to COVID-19 and 
Europe’s role in the global response to the pandemic. We find that, based on the challenges and 
successes of all these responses, a strong argument can be made for ‘more Europe’ – greater 
integration, and stronger EU-level institutions – to lead and govern the COVID-19 response. This has 
direct lessons for the governance and scope of future climate action. 
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Like the climate crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic transcends borders. Both also require 
concerted action at all levels of government. In December 2019, the incoming 
European Commission (EC) led by new President Ursula von der Leyen, announced 
the European Green Deal (EGD), a suite of actions at the European level designed to 
ensure that Europe meets the target of a ‘carbon-neutral continent’ by 2050. However, 
progress on instituting major measures announced in the EGD stalled, when the 
coronavirus crisis hit Europe in early 2020. 
This article considers how the European Union and Member States’ responses to the 
COVID-19 crisis in the first half of 2020 could inform climate action in Europe, and 
particularly the resumption of actions on the EGD. It first outlines the EU’s public 
health and economic responses to COVID-19 and Europe’s role in the global response 
to the pandemic. We find that, based on the challenges and successes of all these 
responses, a strong argument can be made for what we call ‘more Europe’ – greater 
integration, and stronger EU-level institutions – to lead and govern the COVID-19 
response. This has direct lessons for the governance and scope of future climate action. 
Case studies of national responses to the pandemic contain lessons for a strong, 
coherent, radical European response to the climate crisis.  
The European Green Deal 
The announcement of the EGD in December 2019 marked the intersection of three 
major developments in Europe. Munta calls these ‘problem, policy, and politics’ 
(2020). In late 2019, the scale of the problem of climate change crashed in on 
policymakers and political leaders, with longstanding climate campaigners and a 
youth-led climate change movement winning a global media platform and a place at 
national and international forums with demands for serious action to reduce global 
carbon emissions. In Europe, momentum for a comprehensive climate policy had been 
building for at least a decade. The politics of the EC elections also favoured climate 
action, with von der Leyen winning the EC Presidency in part through undertakings to 
Green, Socialist, and Liberal MEPs on climate. Finally, with the retrenchment of the 
US from serious climate action under Donald Trump, a role has opened for the EU, 
the world’s third-largest emitter, to take a leading global role in reducing carbon 
emissions. 
A range of actions in the EGD, from incentivisation to compulsion, gives the EU new 
influence and powers over climate action in Europe and influence in the world. The 
EGD targets 50-55% carbon emission reductions by 2030 and legislates a European 
‘Climate Law’ that would enshrine the goal of a climate-neutral EU continent by 2050. 
Under the EGD, existing environmental policies will be integrated, with the aim of 
establishing a ‘circular economy’ and preserving ecosystem biodiversity. It also 
proposes a ‘Just Transition Fund’, to help carbon-dependent Member States transition 
to renewable energy sources and the renewable energy economy, while supporting 
living standards and livelihoods. Additionally, a ‘Carbon Border Tax' is designed to 
protect European steel and other energy-intensive industries from cheaper 
competitors with lower climate change reduction policies (Guarascio & Ekblom, 2019). 
European importers of these products/services will need to buy carbon allowances, 
similar to those under the European Emissions Trading System. This mechanism aims 
to ensure that European industries trying to lower their carbon emissions will remain 
competitive in global markets and are not punished for their efforts (Allan, 2019).  
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At the time of writing, barely six months had passed since the EGD was first 
announced. Early appraisals of the merits of the EGD broadly fall into two camps. 
Assessments of it that focus on ‘what is achievable’ consider the EGD will be 
implemented, and generally approve of the plan. Assessments that focus on ‘what is 
required’ are much more critical of the EGD, considering its shortcomings and what 
an alternative plan should look like (Storm, 2020).  
Public funding for EGD initiatives will come largely from existing EU funds, and the 
European Commission has promised to ‘mobilize’ private sector investment. Plans for 
funding the EGD have elicited strident criticism of the plan as, in prominent critics’ 
words ‘a colossal exercise in greenwashing’, that offloads risk onto the public, and 
hides Europe’s failure to withdraw completely from the fossil economy (quoted in 
Storm, 2020). Yet, as Storm points out, the failings of the EGD proposal should not be 
a barrier to thinking constructively about what it could become. Storm canvasses a 
range of alternative and more expansive funding sources and instruments, including a 
strengthened carbon tax, and a wealth tax as mooted by international economists. 
Such suggestions can be taken as provocations to think critically, and imaginatively, 
about corporate power and the priorities of public spending, in a world whose primary 
challenge to security and livelihoods is now, and will continue to be, climate change. 
Even among those who support the EGD, there is hesitation that its execution will fail 
or the deal as it stands is not enough to meet the scale of the climate challenge. Storm 
argues that to achieve the 2030 target, greenhouse gas emissions in Europe would 
have to fall by as much as 5.2% each year in the next decade – three times the rate from 
1990-2020. This is a formidable task, ‘Yet [it] still falls short of what is, according to 
climate science, needed to prevent the global mean temperature above the safe 
threshold of 1.5° Celsius’. The Bruegel Institute estimates that ‘even if the Commission 
succeeds in mobilising €1 trillion of investments over ten years, this would just 
represent a third of the additional investment needs associated with the European 
Green Deal’ (2020). Responding to the announcement of the EGD, Mariana 
Mazzucato of the UCL Institute for Innovation in Public Policy recommended 
redesigning European financial instruments to enable innovative and socially directed 
investment and growth (Mazzucato, 2019).  
The EGD also faced significant political challenges to its implementation in early 
2020. Much of the early controversy centred on the Climate Law, which EC Vice 
President Frans Timmermans promised to introduce within 100 days of the EGD’s 
announcement. Only two days after the EGD was announced, Poland declared it would 
opt-out of the 2050 climate neutrality objective (Rankin, 2019). At the end of January, 
Timmermans and the EC opened public debate about the Climate Law, aiming to have 
it in place by the UN Climate Conference, which was scheduled to be held in Glasgow 
late in 2020. The tight timeline, and the expectation that MEPs would be hit with 
requests from industrial sectors asking for special provisions under the Climate Law, 
were obvious impediments to its progress. Meanwhile, many saw securing the 2030 
target as even more urgent than implementing the Climate Law (Simon, 2020). Even 
before the coronavirus hit Europe, opinion on the EGD was already polarised. 
The EU response to COVID-19 
One of the first actions taken in Europe in response to the COVID-19 pandemic aimed 
to improve coordination at the federal level within the EU. On January 28th the EU 
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Council activated the EU integrated political crisis response mechanism (IPCR), which 
is intended to improve flexibility and the timeliness of crisis responses by instituting 
changes to information sharing among Member States, the EC and the European 
External Action Service (Goniewicz et al., 2020). However, as the following section 
makes clear, the EU’s limited mandate on public health, political and economic 
debates about the scale and structure of financial recovery instruments, as well as 
Member States’ political opportunism, complicate a ‘European’ response to COVID-
19. 
The public health response 
The EU has a limited mandate in public health in Europe. Under the Maastricht 
Treaty, its role is to support, complement, or supplement Member States’ actions 
(European Commission, 2020a). The Lisbon Treaty upheld the principle of 
subsidiarity, which in the case of health leaves governance at Member State and 
provincial level, however allowed that the EU “may adopt incentives designed to 
protect and improve human health and in particular to combat the major cross-border 
health scourges, measures concerning monitoring, early warning of and combating 
serious cross-border threats to health” (Tsolova, 2010). COVID-19, of course, perfectly 
fits the description of a “serious cross-border threat to health”. In practical terms, the 
limited EU health mandate meant that while it could facilitate or hinder flows of goods 
and services through Member States, its powers to direct public health responses were 
highly circumscribed. 
This goes some way towards explaining the sluggishness and the limits of the EU’s 
early response to the COVID-19 crisis. While COVID-19 was first identified in China in 
late 2019, by February 2020 the global epicentre of the pandemic had shifted to 
Europe. The EU was criticised in the first weeks of the pandemic crisis for moving too 
slowly, with Italy in particularly lamenting that the EU was “slow to help” (Boffey, 
2020). The Centre for European Reform, meanwhile, observed that “national 
governments have taken centre stage during the crisis, while the EU’s initial reaction 
was slow and rather haphazard” (Gostyńska-Jakubowska & Scazzieri, 2020). As Long 
points out (2020), while some of these criticisms, especially of the flow of equipment 
(such as masks and ventilators) were valid, others involved areas that are outside the 
EU’s mandate. For instance, the EU does not have the authority to enforce most of the 
COVID-19 responses recommended by WHO (WHO, 2020). Such responsibilities, 
specifically reporting of case incidences, responses to infection, and infection 
prevention and control, clearly lie at Member State level. 
Yet EU responses to COVID-19 have also demonstrated the importance of 
coordination between public health authorities and governments. Long (2020) 
suggests that the EU’s origin as economic union may have contributed to the initially 
low level of attention being paid to the recommendations of its own health bodies, 
including the ECDC (European Centre for Disease Control), resulting in slower 
responses in the areas it did have a mandate for. The ECDC was, however, responsive 
in compiling data and in increasing testing capability, both of which began in late 
January. Meanwhile, the flow of equipment and sharing of resources, which could 
have been facilitated centrally, was notably missing in the initial weeks of the 
pandemic. In March, the EC threatened Germany with infringement proceedings over 
its export ban on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (Bayer et. al., 2020), and 
France requisitioned production of face masks in early March (FRANCE 24, 2020).  
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This culminated in the creation of the rescEU stockpile of medical equipment, a 
common reserve of key equipment including PPE, surgical masks, testing equipment 
and respirators, 90% financed by the EC (EC, 2020). This was a practical 
demonstration of the benefits of organising a response at the EU level. It does not, 
however, amount to the accrual of new powers to the EU, or the assertion of those 
powers over Member States. As de Ruijter et al. note, this cooperation on procurement, 
distribution, and supply chain management is voluntary and contractual: ‘Decisions 
regarding urgency and need are organised in a fully contractual manner, which means 
that they must be taken inter-governmentally’ (2020). It is also ad hoc, and reactive, 
part of an unplanned emergency response rather than an organised emergency 
preparedness response. The lack of preparedness is noteworthy, given that both the 
WHO and CDC have had sophisticated guidelines for viral pandemic preparedness in 
place since 2009.  
The experience of COVID-19 informs a case made by public health practitioners, 
policymakers and scholars for a stronger role for the EU in public health. De Ruijter et 
al. (2020) argue for centralised control of medical countermeasures including 
procurement, stockpiling, and allocation of equipment and medicines. In the past, this 
has been inhibited by Member States’ insistence on separating health law and EU 
internal market law. However, the Commission’s re-reading of the ‘proportionality 
principle’ in light of COVID-19 implies that health may in future be considered an EU 
objective, overriding Member State concerns. Similarly, Costa-i-Font (2020), notes 
the relative weakness of the ECDC compared to international counterparts, 
particularly the American Centre for Disease Control (CDC), the discrepancies 
between Member State responses to COVID-19, and the retreat to national self-
interest in a time of crisis. Based on this she makes the case for creating a public health 
authority at the European level, ‘as independent as the ECB … with a clear mission and 
remit for global health’. 
The economic response to COVID-19 
From its beginnings, in Italy and Spain, the COVID-19 crisis threatened to reopen old 
divisions in the EU between the prosperous north and the poorer south. In March 
2020, Italy, Spain, France, and six other Member States called for so-called ‘corona 
bonds’ to support their economic responses to COVID-19: this is a form of mutualised 
debt, issued by the European Investment Bank, which would be shared by all EU 
Member States (Euronews, 2020). The argument for corona bonds was based on 
equity and solidarity, with advocates pointing out that the hardest hit nations, through 
no fault of their own, faced a greater economic crisis than their northern European 
partners. However, richer, northern European nations, led by the Netherlands, 
opposed the measure on the basis that their funds should not be used to bolster 
another nation’s response to the crisis. The Netherlands, and others, insisted on the 
use of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to finance recoveries.  
Germany’s resistance was decisive in ensuring corona bonds were dropped during 
negotiations of the ‘Eurogroup’ of EU Finance Ministers at the end of March. Instead 
several interim measures were announced on 9 April, ahead of work on a longer-term 
EU recovery fund. The interim measures included a European Investment Bank fund 
of €200 billion accessible to companies hit by the health crisis, and a €100 billion 
commitment from the EC towards jobless reinsurance. It also made loans of up to 2% 
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of any Member State’s economic output available under the ESM to cover emergency 
health costs.  
Use of the ESM was always going to be a fraught and contested measure (Montani, 
2020), because it evokes memories of the punitive regime of austerity forced on Greece 
during the Eurozone Crisis of 2010-2012. While it is unlikely that austerity economics 
would be considered as a tool in the COVID-19 recovery efforts, for Southern European 
Member States the EU’s economic response is nonetheless a test of European 
solidarity and their own, national politics (Tooze, 2020). For example, if the Italian 
public perceives the EU as uncompromising, public opinion may shift to favour Prime 
Minister Conte’s hard-line Eurosceptic rival, Matteo Salvini.  
Eventually, both corona bonds and the ESM were side-lined, in favour of a €750 billion 
recovery fund announced in May 2020, called “Next Generation EU”. The fund 
borrows from capital markets and includes both loans and grants (Politico, 2020). 
Pandemic recovery and climate action are being explicitly linked in this EU response, 
however climate initiatives had mixed fortunes in July negotiations over the final deal: 
30% of the total budget package is earmarked for climate objectives. However, the 
EU’s proposed €40 billion Just Transition Fund (Čavoški, 2020) was slashed to €10 
billion (European Council, 2020).  
Pandemic as political opportunity—Hungary’s approach 
Hungary’s right-wing, nationalist government took an opportunity presented by the 
COVID-19 pandemic to consolidate authoritarian powers under President Viktor 
Orbán and the ruling Fidesz Party (Zerofsky, 2020). This continues a process 
underway since 2010, when Orbán tapped into popular resentment of austerity and 
growing inequality in the wake of the GFC, to win a landslide election on an anti-
establishment, Eurosceptic, nationalist, and anti-IMF platform. His government still 
has a near unlimited ability to legislate, make constitutional amendments, and appoint 
a friendly judiciary. Orbán used these powers to transform the country into what has 
been described as “a political greenhouse for an odd kind of soft autocracy, combining 
crony capitalism and far-right rhetoric with a single-party political culture” (Kingsley, 
2018). 
Hungary, which closed its borders early and employed strict measures, seems to have 
had a relatively low number of COVID-19 infections compared to other EU Member 
States, with a reported 4347 cases, and 596 deaths as of Wednesday 22 July (Johns 
Hopkins University Centre for Systems Science and Engineering, 2020). This is likely 
due to rapidly deployed and strictly maintained lockdown measures that were 
gradually eased from early May. It must be noted however that the veracity of these 
figures remains unverified, among other reasons because of limited press freedom in 
Hungary and the threat of jail time for reporting on the virus that the government 
regards as misleading.  
On 11 March 2020, Orbán’s government declared a state of emergency, banning 
incoming travel from China, Italy, and Iran. Two weeks later the state of emergency 
was extended indefinitely with the passing of the “Draft Law on Protecting Against 
Coronavirus”. The new law included a number of measures such as criminalising the 
spreading of “distorted truths” or breaking isolation orders. It also gave the Prime 
Minister new power to rule by decree (Serhan, 2020).  
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These new powers were heavily criticised within and outside Hungary. They led to a 
group of thirteen national leaders from the European People’s Party to call for Orbán’s 
Fidesz party to be expelled from the centre-right political group (De La Baume, 2020; 
Walshe, 2020). Responding to the passage of these new powers into law, Von Der 
Leyen and the EC issued statements in defence of democracy, ‘European values’ and 
human rights, while not naming Hungary as the reason for these statements. The next 
day, 17 Member States issued a joint statement expressing their concern about issues 
‘arising from the adoption of certain emergency measures’ (quoted in Flynn, 2020).  
In May, the Hungarian Parliament voted to revoke the law, as promised by the 
government. However, human rights groups have warned that a second bill, 
introduced to Parliament at the same time, lays the basis for future rule by decree for 
an indefinite period of time (BBC, Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2020). Through 
the course of the pandemic, the government has been both strategic and prolific in its 
use of the emergency powers, having issued over 100 decrees since April (Tanacs & 
Huet, 2020; Zalan, 2020). These measures can be seen to solidify Orbán’s position by 
removing legal impediments to his power, defunding his opposition, and empowering 
his allies. Orbán and the Fidesz Party have utilised the pandemic to their political 
advantage (Harangozó, 2020). 
Member States and the EC’s response to Orbán’s actions have been criticised as 
ineffectual. Flynn argues that attempts to keep the peace with Hungary undermine EU 
integration (2020): ‘this apparent reluctance of European heads of state and 
government to ‘interfere’ in another’s ‘domestic’ affairs is a relic of a bygone age, a time 
when we really could draw such bright lines between the ‘national and the ‘European’’. 
Flynn counsels a strong, political counter-move by Europe: ‘Remedying the 
authoritarian drift in the Union requires concerted political action, both within and 
between Member States’. 
Europe in the world 
The EU and Member States have demonstrated greater unity in their efforts in the 
global arena in response to the global COVID-19 pandemic. On 8 April, with a number 
of Member States still impacted severely by the virus, the EU resolved to become 
involved in fostering a coordinated multilateral response by leading efforts in the G7 
and G20 in conjunction with the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF and other 
multilateral actors, the so-called “Team Europe” approach (European Commission, 
2020b, 2020c). This initiative aims to support partner countries dealing with the 
pandemic through the (re)deployment of combined resources from the EU, its 
Member States, and financial institutions, in particular, the European Investment 
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. At the time of 
writing, the Team Europe package had a capacity of €36 billion.  
The approach has three priority areas: responding to the immediate health crisis and 
urgent humanitarian needs; strengthening health, water and sanitation systems; and 
mitigating the social and economic impacts of COVID-19. The Council of the European 
Union has also set out that these short-term and emergency responses must align with 
longer term measures to effectively address the structural impacts of the pandemic on 
partner countries effectively. It also intends that Recovery plans to be sustainable and 
in line with the 2030 Sustainable Development agenda and the EGD (Council of the 
European Union, 2020). 
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 “More Europe” – but how? 
Written six months after COVID-19 emerged in Europe, assessments of how the 
pandemic will affect the implementation of the EGD are, of necessity speculative. For 
most, COVID-19 is a both a potential impediment and a potential catalyst for concerted 
climate action. Commentators highlight how the pandemic has thrown the EGD off-
course, losing valuable months of negotiations and implementation to the crisis. 
Europe’s changed budgetary outlook might also disincentivise Member States to adopt 
the EGD. Equally, the reconstruction and recovery period might be seen as a ‘reset’ for 
Europe’s fraught climate politics, and EGD actions might be built into the COVID-19 
recovery effort (Mason, 2020; Munta, 2020; Elkerbout et. al., 2020). 
The EC and some Member States are attempting to put the EGD and climate action at 
the centre of Europe’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. In mid-April 
the EC announced that some EGD initiatives would be delayed until 2021, however it 
retained the schedule for key priorities including the assessment of new emission 
reduction targets for 2030 (Siddi, 2020). Since then, Germany and France together 
sponsored proposals for the recovery that called for increases to the 2030 emissions 
target, reviews of state aid laws in light of climate policy, reforming and strengthening 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and developing sectoral roadmaps for a 
green recovery (German Foreign Ministry, 2020). 
Institutions 
The future of state aid, in particular, could see changes in longstanding EU policy. The 
EC temporarily lifted strict state aid rules as part of its initial economic response to the 
COVID-19 crisis. Mason (2020) argues that ongoing reforms to state aid can be used 
to promote low-carbon strategies. Motta and Peitz give the airline industry and the 
automotive industry as example sectors this strategy might target (2020). They also 
suggest that the disbursement of recovery funds might be achieved and regulated by 
sector, rather than at Member State level. They depend on the principle of subsidiarity 
to justify such an EU-wide response, arguing that as environmental impacts of climate 
change are an externality affecting all of Europe, and one that cannot be dealt with 
effectively by individual Member States this is an appropriate use of EU powers. 
This is one example of how EU responses to COVID-19 can be extended into an 
argument for ‘more Europe, not less’ in climate policy, which likewise targets an 
emergency that crosses national borders. However, the creation of new institutions 
and the reinterpretation of the EC’s role is not a silver bullet for the challenges facing 
the EGD. Siddi highlights the legal competence of EU institutions, particularly the EC, 
as potential determinants of the EGD’s future success: ‘a protracted intra-EU turf war 
for competences, or a weak mandate for the institutions that should drive the Green 
Deal (particularly the Commission), could become significant obstacles to the 
implementation of the Green Deal’ (2020). 
Politics 
It follows that a successful effort to influence recalcitrant Member States will be 
political, as much or more than it will be institutional. The examples of the 
negotiations over economic recovery and Hungary’s recalcitrance and political 
opportunism demonstrate how, in a crisis, perceived national self-interest can be 
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transacted through national and regional self-assertion at the expense of a European 
solution. 
This requires moving past the sclerotic climate politics of the 2010-2019 period, which 
were overshadowed by the Eurozone crisis and Great Recession. Skovgaard views the 
failure of climate policy in this period through the lens of competing ‘policy frames’ 
(2014). Some Member States saw in the GFC and its aftermath an opportunity for 
‘green growth’, marrying the transition to renewables and emissions reductions to 
economic growth. Others, notably Poland, and mostly heavily coal-dependent nations, 
saw the economic and policy choices facing Europe in this period as a ‘trade off’ 
between climate and growth.  
The same two policy frames can be seen in initial responses to COVID-19, and the way 
governments and policymakers are linking this to climate action. In March, the Czech 
Premier Andrej Babiš explicitly used the language of a ‘trade off’, telling reporters that 
‘Europe should forget about the Green Deal now and focus on the coronavirus instead’ 
(EURACTIV, 2020). Even after a U-turn in May which saw the Czech Republic back 
the new recovery fund, its draft statement supporting a green transition demanded 
Europe ‘quantify the actual impact of the current pandemic on the economy of 
Member States and of the EU as a whole’ before making any decisions about increasing 
the 2030 climate targets (EURACTIV, 2020). 
The EU has lately approached this challenge through a new ‘frame’, that of ‘Just 
Transition’. This means recognising the social costs of the transition to a green 
economy. It also recognises that these costs will be greater in coal-dependent 
economies. This frame can be occupied – arguably, cynically – by both advocates of 
green growth and those who fear a ‘trade off’. The original EGD communication uses 
the language of ‘just transition’ and European solidarity in a plan ‘leaving no one 
behind’ (EC, 2019). In public statements at the initial December 2019 EGD 
negotiations, Babiš framed Czech demands for concessions on energy infrastructure, 
specifically arguing for a continuing role for nuclear power, in terms of the need for 
‘electricity for people, for firms, and heating’. Similarly, Orbán’s Chief of Staff, Gergely 
Gulyas, said ‘The 2050 climate goals cannot have the consequence of hiking the prices 
of food or energy’ (Euronews, 2019). 
As discussed above, the Just Transition Fund proposal presented to negotiations over 
Next Generation Europe in July was slashed. The EC also proposed that Member 
States must commit to the 2050 Climate Neutrality goal in order to access Just 
Transition Funds. Poland, now the only Member State which has yet to commit to the 
2050 goal, has won a major concession at the negotiations. The final agreement 
stipulates that Member States who have not committed to the Climate Neutrality goal 
can only access 50% of their Just Transition entitlements. 
Finance 
In the debates and negotiations about Europe’s economic recovery, several shibboleths 
of austerity economics have broken down, from the abandonment of the ESM, to the 
eventual isolation of the ‘frugal four’ (Austria, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands) 
who opposed grant payments at the Next Generation negotiations. In their place, debt 
has been accepted, and instituted as an instrument for recovery and economic 
development. So, too, the language and practice of European ‘solidarity’ informs 
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recovery plans to a far greater extent than it did during the Eurozone crisis. The grants 
funded under Next Generation Europe are some distance from the original, corona 
bonds proposal, yet they also represented a significant development by putting in place 
common debt issuance in Europe. 
Some commentators are calling for more fundamental, long-term reforms, that would 
institute closer integration and expansionary policy. The UCL Institute for Innovation 
and Public Purpose (IIPP) suggests that genuine solidarity requires more Europe and 
closer integration to create a de facto, central fiscal authority through common debt 
issuance (IIPP, 2020a). This logic is being applied to climate action funding: Guido 
Montani has suggested financing the EGD and other emissions reductions schemes 
through a reduction in global defence spending (Montani, 2020).  
“Team Europe” in the post-COVID world 
Europe has demonstrated a more unified approach on global actions, both in the 
COVID-19 pandemic and in environmental action. However, it still encounters a 
seriously challenging setting for future climate policy, in a time that may be marked 
by global downturn and growing antagonisms between the world’s major powers. One 
direct result of the COVID-19 pandemic is a crisis in the oil sector and in global energy 
security. As the IIPP puts it, a ‘post-COVID-19 world’ may be characterised by 
‘dramatically lowered oil prices, which impairs the profitability of the entire industry, 
and raised significant energy security and geopolitical questions’ (IIPP, 2020a).  
Climate diplomacy, which presented itself as an opportunity and a motivation in the 
lead-up to the EGD’s announcement, will undoubtedly be both more sensitive and 
more critical in the future. The EU has a long history of climate diplomacy, marked in 
the past 10 years particularly by its successes at the Paris climate negotiations in 2015, 
and its efforts working with third countries in coalition (Delreux & Ohler, 2019). The 
strong commitments of the EGD exemplify its approach, which combines leadership 
by example, directionality, and ambition. However, the global implications of the EGD 
have been criticised, particularly the carbon border tax, which sceptics argue will be 
difficult to implement, and some have branded ‘green protectionism’ (Siddi, 2020). 
Europe can nonetheless potentially act as both an influence and an actor in a future, 
global green transition. The IPP takes the EGD’s plans to turn the European 
Investment Bank into the world’s ‘climate bank’ as a model for other nations to follow 
in pursuing a ‘green’ recovery (2020b). It also emphasises that a just transition must 
include nations in the Global South, which should be supported through finance and 
supporting access to technology and capital goods. The “Team Europe” approach to 
the global COVID-19 response, by building in commitments to the Paris Climate Goals 
and the Sustainable Development Goals, is a step in this direction. 
Conclusion 
The EU is clearly committed to a ‘green’ recovery from the COVID-19 crisis, with the 
EGD at its centre. Innovative use of EU institutions, policy, and financial instruments 
in this crisis may have ongoing ramifications for thinking about implementation of the 
EGD. The Next Generation EU negotiations, particularly in embedding EGD initiatives 
in the European recovery and instituting new financial instruments, despite 
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qualifications on its success, is an achievement that puts a Just Transition squarely in 
the frame for future policy developments. 
Yet the fears that COVID-19 could derail serious climate action are not unfounded. 
Even before the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe, there were serious 
doubts about whether the EGD was enough, or if its instruments were suitable for 
meeting the challenge of the climate crisis. These doubts have not gone away. The 
recalcitrance of coal-dependent Member States and resistance to EU-level influence 
and global political and economic upheaval will likely continue to present challenges 
to EU action on climate in the future, as it has done during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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